We study lower bounds on the query complexity of determining correlated equilibrium. In particular, we consider a query model in which an n-player game is specified via a black box that returns players' utilities at pure action profiles. In this model, we establish that in order to compute a correlated equilibrium, any deterministic algorithm must query the black box an exponential (in n) number of times.
INTRODUCTION
Equilibria are fundamental constructs in game theory that formally specify potential outcomes in strategic settings. Nash equilibrium [Nash 1951 ] and its generalization, correlated equilibrium [Aumann 1974 [Aumann , 1987 , are arguably the two most wellestablished examples of such notions of rationality. Both of these concepts denote distributions over strategies of players at which no player could benefit by unilateral deviation. What distinguishes these constructs is the fact that mixed Nash equilibrium is defined to be a product of independent distributions (one of every player), whereas a correlated equilibrium is a general (joint) probability distribution over the strategy space.
Questions related to the complexity of determining equilibria have been a driving force behind research at the intersection of computer science and economics. Recent results imply that it is unlikely that there exists an efficient algorithm for determining mixed Nash equilibrium, even in the two-player case (see [Chen et al. 2009; Daskalakis Y. Babichenko gratefully acknowledges the support of the Walter S. Baer and Jeri Weiss fellowship. This research was supported by NSF grants CNS-0846025 and CCF-1101470, along with a Linde/SISL postdoctoral fellowship. After the completion of this result we became aware of a recent and independent work by Hart and Nisan [2013] that generalizes the result presented in this article. In particular, Hart and Nisan [2013] establish query-complexity lower bounds for randomized algorithms and computing approximate equilibria; for a discussion of this work see Section 1. We believe that this article provides a more direct proof for deterministic algorithms; such a result is interesting in its own right and can potentially lead to useful implications. For example, a relevant consequence of our proof is that it establishes the tightness of the result by Jiang and Leyton-Brown [2013] . This implication is discussed in Section 4.1 of the article and it does not follow directly from the proof of Hart and Nisan [2013] . Authors' addresses: Y. Babichenko and S. Barman (corresponding author), Center for the Mathematics of Information, California Institute of Technology; corresponding author's email: barman@caltech.edu. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Note that if the game is specified in normal form (i.e., the utilities of all the players at every action profile in the game are given to the algorithm), then the input size itself is exponential in n, but our objective is to determine if a correlated equilibrium can be computed in time polynomial in n. A standard approach for dealing with such scenarios is to assume that the game is specified via a black box. The algorithm may query the black box about the game and receive answers in O(1) time (or in poly(n, m) time).
The core modeling question is which type of queries can the black box answer? An acceptable model is one in which every query is a product distribution over strategies, x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) (i.e., a mixed action profile), and the black box returns the expected value of the utilities of the players, (E s∼x [u i (s)]) i , as an answer. Such a model is applicable if the game has a succinct representation and the expected utility of each player can be computed in poly(n, m) time for every mixed action profile (see [Papadimitriou and Roughgarden 2008; Jiang and Leyton-Brown 2013] ). For such a querying model, building upon the work of Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] , Jiang and LeytonBrown [2013] prove that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for computing exact correlated equilibrium. In particular, a polynomial (in n and m) number of queries are required in this model.
But for general games, it is not always reasonable to assume that such a black box exists. The support of a mixed action profile may be exponential in n; therefore, the existence of a black box, which aggregates over those exponentially many outcomes, is a strong assumption.
A more applicative model is one in which the queries are pure-action profiles (i.e., queries are of the form (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ), where s i is a specific strategy of player i) and the black box returns the utilities of players at those profiles. For example, in a repeatedgame framework [Hart and Mas-Colell 2000] where players do not know the game, they observe the outcome of the realized pure action even if they played a mixed strategy. It might seem that the model is too weak for efficiently computing a correlated equilibrium, because only a very small fraction of the game is known after a polynomial number of queries. But, surprisingly, it turns out that an approximate correlated equilibrium 1 can be computed using such a black box in polynomial time. This can be done using procedures-in particular, regret-minimizing dynamics-developed in Hart [2005] , Foster and Vohra [1998] , and Littlestone and Warmuth [1994] . These dynamics converge to an approximate correlated equilibrium in a polynomial number of steps.
Another observation that brings up the applicability of the pure-action-query model is as follows: in every game, there exists a correlated equilibrium with polynomial-sized support (e.g., [Germano and Lugosi 2007] ). This is because correlated equilibria are defined by a polynomial (specifically, O(nm 2 )) number of linear inequalities; therefore, a basic feasible solution of such a linear feasibility program will have a polynomial number of nonzero entries. In addition, using only pure-action queries, we can efficiently verify whether a probability distribution with polynomial-sized support is a correlated equilibrium or not.
Hence, in this context, it is natural to ask if an exact correlated equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time using pure-action queries. This was posed by Hart [2011] as an open question.
In this article, we answer this question in the negative: the number of pure-action queries that are required to find an exact correlated equilibrium is exponential in n, even for games with two actions per player. This result shows that the algorithms in Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] and Jiang and Leyton-Brown [2013] that use mixed-action queries (i.e., a succinct representation of the game) are the best possible in the sense that if we can evaluate utilities only at pure-action profiles and not at mixed-action profiles, then a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that computes a correlated equilibrium does not exist.
We note that similar black-box models have been previously considered by Hirsch et al. [1989] and Chen and Deng [2008] in the context of determining fixed points. Specifically, Chen and Deng [2008] provide tight query-complexity bounds for determining fixed points. The black-box model has been considered in the context of Nash equilibrium by Fearnley et al. [2013] . More recently, in the query model, bounds have been established for approximate Nash equilibrium as well. In particular, Fearnley and Savani [2014] derive a lower bound on the number of queries required to determine an approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games. Complementing this lower bound, Fearnley and Savani also present several classes of n-player games in which a polynomial number of queries is enough to find an approximate Nash equilibrium. The result of Babichenko [2014] shows that (unlike the classes of games mentioned in Fearnley and Savani [2014] ) in general games, an exponential number of queries are needed to determine an approximate Nash equilibrium. Goldberg and Roth [2014] study the query complexity of several types of approximate equilibria. In particular, they prove that for games with succinct representation-say of size p-the query complexity of approximate Nash equilibrium is polynomial in n (the number of players), m (the number of actions for each player), and p (the representation size). This result demonstrates that the exponential lower bound presented in the present in Babichenko [2014] cannot hold for succinctly representable games. We point out that the query algorithm of Goldberg and Roth [2014] for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium is not computationally efficient.
Query complexity of correlated equilibrium has also been studied in a concurrent work by Hart and Nisan [2013] . In particular, Hart and Nisan generalize the result presented here. Overall, we show that in the pure-action-query model, there is no polynomial time deterministic algorithm for computing exact correlated equilibrium. Whereas, regret-minimizing dynamics give us a polynomial-time randomized algorithm for computing approximate correlated equilibrium. In order to complete the picture, one should answer the following two questions in this pure-action-query model: (i) Does there exist a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm for computing approximate correlated equilibrium?; (ii) can a polynomial-time randomized algorithm compute an exact correlated equilibrium? Hart and Nisan [2013] show that the answer to both of these questions is negative.
NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider games with n players, two actions {0, 1} per player, and a utility function u i : {0, 1} n → R for every player i ∈ [n]. We will use V := {0, 1} n to denote the set of pure action profiles in the game and also the set of vertices in the n-dimensional hypercube H n . For s ∈ V , we denote by s¬i : = (s 1 , . . . , s i−1 , 1 − s i , s i+1 In a binary-action game, a correlated equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. A (joint) probability distribution σ over {0, 1} n is a correlated equilibrium if for every player i and action s i ∈ {0, 1}, we have
where s −i denotes the strategies chosen by players other than i.
We write s = (s i , s −i ) and use the definition of d i (s) to get
Therefore, if σ is a correlated equilibrium, then the following holds for every player i
Note that Inequality (1) is a necessary condition for σ to be a correlated equilibrium, but it is not sufficient.
We will also consider coarse correlated equilibrium meaning probability distributions π over strategy profiles that satisfy
for every player i and action s i in i's action set (which in general can contain more than two actions). A coarse correlated equilibrium is a generalization of correlated equilibrium in which a player's deviation (s i ) is committed to in advance and independent of the sampled strategy profile (s). Coarse correlated equilibria are sometimes called the Hannan set (e.g., see [Young 2004 
]).
Remark 2.3. In binary-action games, the set of correlated equilibria coincides with the set of coarse correlated equilibria.
To prove our result, we will need the following giant-component lemma over hypercubes. For subsets S, T ⊆ V , we denote by δ(S, T ) the set of edges in the hypercube H n that connect S and T .
LEMMA 2.4. For any subset of vertices S ⊂ V of cardinality less than
, the number of vertices in the largest connected component of V \ S is greater than 2 n−1 .
PROOF. We denote the edge expansion of the hypercube by h(H n ). That is,
Since the second-largest eigenvalue of the hypercube is 1 − 2 n (see, e.g., [Trevisan 2011]), using Cheeger's inequality (see, e.g., [Chung 1997 ]), we get that h(H n ) ≥ 1/n. Therefore, for any C ⊂ V , we have
Say we are given an S ⊂ V that satisfies |S| < 2 n n 2 +1
. Denote by C 1 , . . . , C t the connected components of V \ S. Assume for contradiction that these components satisfy
. Since all the edges from C k to V \ C k must have an endpoint (i.e., an end vertex) in S-and not in any other connected component-there are at least
incoming edges into S, which implies that there are at least
) vertices in S (because every vertex has at most n incoming edges), which contradicts the assumption on the size of S.
LOWER BOUND
Our main result is as follows.
THEOREM 3.1. Let A be a deterministic algorithm that, for any n-player binary-action game G, determines a correlated equilibrium after asking q pure-action queries. Then
. This is in contrast to mixed-action queries, where q = poly(n, m) suffices [Jiang and Leyton-Brown 2013; Papadimitriou and Roughgarden 2008] . This is also in contrast to probabilistic regret-minimizing dynamics (e.g., regret matching [Hart 2005] ) that determine correlated ε-equilibrium using poly(n, m, 1 ε ) pure-action queries. We get the following corollary from Remark 2.3. COROLLARY 3.2. Let A be a deterministic algorithm that, for any n-player binaryaction game G, determines a coarse correlated equilibrium after asking q pure-action queries. Then, q ≥ 2 n n 2 +1 . PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1. The high-level argument behind the result is that if we are given subexponentially-many strategy profiles (i.e., vertices of the hypercube), one after the other, then we can adaptively set utilities at these profiles such that no correlated equilibrium can be constructed using them. To develop some intuition as to how we accomplish this construction, say Q is the set of queried (pure) action profiles and we set the utilities such that the sum of difference values, D(s), is equal to −1 for all s ∈ Q. Then by Remark 2.2, there does not exist a correlated equilibrium σ whose support is contained in Q. The querying algorithm might use strategy profiles that are not in Q, but the fact that the utilities at these strategies are unknown to the algorithm lets us ensure that any proposed distribution is not a correlated equilibrium.
As stated previously, a key element for us is an adaptive process that, given a sequence of strategy profiles, sets utilities such that D(s) is negative at every queried strategy. We model this as a multi-round interaction between a querier (surrogate for the deterministic algorithm) and an adversary (representing the black box). In each round, the querier sends in a strategy profile s to the adversary which in turn returns a vector of differences d (s) . Note that in a binary-action game, the vector d(s) must satisfy the constraint
for every player i. And those are the only constraints on the difference vectors d(s) in the game. Hence, the adversary needs to ensure that the returned vectors satisfy the complementarity Constraint (4). It is worth mentioning that unlike the black box, the adversary is designed to return difference values, d(s). But this does not reduce the applicability of the interaction model. Given that the adversary returns difference values that satisfy Property (4) for queried strategy profiles s, we can set utilities, at s and its neighbors (specifically u i at s¬i for all i), that match the difference values reported by the adversary. These utilities can then be considered as the response of the black box at s. Also, note that at as the querying process goes on, the magnitude of the difference values d i (s) set by the adversary might increase. However, the bit complexity of d i (s)s remain polynomially bounded; this follows from Equation (5). In addition, since players' utilities can be expressed as linear combinations of the difference values, the bit complexity of the underlying utilities is polynomially bounded as well.
Let Q t ⊂ V be the set of queries that the querier asks in the first t rounds. We define Denote R = W t \ W t+1 . R is the set of vertices that got disconnected from W t because some vertex, say q t+1 , got queried. That is, removing q t+1 disconnects W t (see Figure 1) . In general, R might contain other vertices besides q t+1 . Nonetheless, R has to be a connected set of vertices. Let v ∈ W t+1 be a neighbor of q t+1 -if W t gets disconnected by removing q t+1 , then such a vertex must exist. By construction, the vertex set R ∪ {v} forms a connected component (see Figure 1) . Write T to denote some spanning tree of R ∪ {v}. We root the tree T at v and define vectors d(s) for every s ∈ R in a bottom-up manner: from the leaves to the root. Given a leaf s with the edge (s, s¬i) in T (i.e., s¬i is the parent of s in T ), we know by Property (P2) that so far we have not assigned a value to d i (s). Moreover, this holds for all edges out of s that end in R. Write index set J = { j | s¬ j ∈ R}. By (P2), we are free to to assign values to d j (s) and d j (s¬ j). For j ∈ J \ {i}, we set d j (s) = d j (s¬ j) = 0, and finally assign
and
. Such an assignment ensures that Constraint (4) is satisfied for all defined values. Once values for s have been assigned, we remove it from consideration and recurse over T . Using this procedure, (5) guarantees that Property (P1) is maintained; in particular, D(s) = −1 for all s ∈ R. In addition, since we did not assign difference d i (s) along any edge (s, s¬i) such that s, s¬i ∈ W t+1 , Property (P2) is maintained as well.
As already stated, Property (P3) holds because no vertex in R \ {q t+1 } is directly connected to W t+1 .
Overall, the querier submitsueries to the adversary with q < 2 n (n 2 +1)
. After theueries have been processed by the adversary, we split V into three sets.
(1) F := V \ W q . This is the set of (fully-assigned) vertices, s, for which all the coordinates of the difference vector, d(s), have been assigned a value. Also, by construction, for such s we have the sum of differences D(s) = −1. (2) P := {s ∈ W q | there exists a neighbor of s in F}. These are vertices, s, with a partial assignment. That is, some of the coordinates of the difference vector d(s) have been assigned a value. Such a partial assignment follows from the fact that we must have fixed the difference values for several neighbors of s (but not for all of them otherwise, s will belong to F). (3) N := V \ (F ∪ P). These are the vertices with no assignments. In other words, for all s ∈ N, the entire vector d(s) is unassigned.
By Lemma 2.4 we know that |W q | > 2 n−1 , since W q is the largest connected component of the graph V \Q q . Therefore, |F| < 2 n−1 . By Property (P3), we know that all the vertices in P are neighbors of Q q ; therefore, |P| ≤ n|Q q | ≤ n n 2 +1 2 n , and hence,
The last inequality holds for all n ≥ 6. Denote by x the probability distribution over V that the querier submits after theueries. For subset S ⊂ V , write x(S) to denote the cumulative probability of vertices in S, x(S) := s∈S x(s). a correlated equilibrium. Note that by scaling the utilities, we can extend the same arguments to prove the necessity of the reduced problem for any vector y ∈ R n + . Overall, in the pure-action-query model, the problem of computing correlated equilibrium is equivalent to the reduced problem. The result of Jiang and Leyton-Brown [2013] establishes that in order to compute a correlated equilibrium in polynomial time, it is sufficient to solve the reduced problem in polynomial time. On the other hand, if there exists a vector y for which the reduced problem cannot be solved efficiently, then the arguments presented in this article prove that a correlated equilibrium cannot be efficiently determined.
